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INTRODUcIION 
In 1989, Cass Sunstein1 published an article entitled On the Costs 
and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action.2 Sunstein 
apparently meant the words "costs" and "benefits" in an informal 
sense, as the article considered the advantages and disadvantages of 
aggressive judicial review without pretense of explicit quantification. 
That article was several generations ago in Sunstein scholarship, al­
most 100 articles and over a dozen books. The central concerns of that 
article, however, are relevant to an assessment of Sunstein's latest 
book, whose title, The Cost-Benefit State, uses the words "costs" and 
"benefits" as labels for quantitative assessments of the effects of gov­
ernmental actions. Sunstein, though a democratic theorist rather than 
an economist, enthusiastically urges agencies to make decisions based 
on numerical assessments of regulatory consequences, factoring in 
variables ranging from effects on consumer prices to lives saved. The 
book is not so much a primer on cost-benefit analysis as a manifesto, 
concluding without apology that cost-benefit analysis "is for every­
one" (pp. 19-20). 
It may seem ironic, then, that The Cost-Benefit State is written in 
much the same easygoing, engaging style as the 1989 article. Though 
illustrating with examples how cost-benefit analysis might prevent 
regulations whose costs exceed benefits,3 and perhaps more startlingly 
how it might spur regulations whose benefits exceed costs, 4 Sunstein 
makes no attempt to quantify the costs and benefits of cost-benefit 
analysis itself. At one point, Sunstein muses about whether a version 
of cost-benefit analysis survives cost-benefit analysis (p. 121) but his 
analysis has less quantification than even some of the agency analyses 
that he criticizes in the book.5 "The answer is that we cannot be sure,'' 
he concedes. "But the current situation is not nearly as good as it 
could be, and if the analysis is done well, there is every reason to ex­
pect that it will lead to improvements" (p. 121). 
My intent, however, is not to criticize Sunstein for writing the book 
in a conventional form, without mapping his arguments into a series of 
calculations. After all, even a study assessing cost-benefit analysis 
quantitatively might not survive cost-benefit analysis (and so on to in-
1. Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of 
Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. 
2. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522. 
3. See, e.g., p. 128 (urging the courts to remand the EPA's rule on ozone). 
4. P. 7 (describing the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs' use of cost-benefit 
analysis to encourage beneficial regulations). 
5. For an example, see p. 108, which criticizes the "EP A's own public justification [of a 
regulation as] extremely long and detailed but in important respects vague and conclusory." 
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finite regress), even if cost-benefit analysis in general is justified. The 
reason is not so much on the costs side - a law professor's time is not 
the scarcest of resources - as on the benefits side. Any study inevita­
bly could be attacked as suffering from methodological imperfections. 
There may be no obvious objective way to determine, for example, 
how much more expensive it is for an agency to engage in cost-benefit 
analysis than in old-fashioned reasoning, at least in the absence of a 
controlled experiment. In the absence of such a study, Sunstein's ar­
gument would not be much more persuasive if it included a back-of­
the-envelope calculation of the benefits and costs of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
That cost-benefit analysis would not make much difference to the 
quality of Sunstein's arguments does present a paradox, however. Why 
should we embrace cost-benefit analysis as a means for justifying ac­
tion except when it comes to arguments about undertaking cost­
benefit analysis itself? Based on the conception of cost-benefit analysis 
that emerges in the book, I suspect that Sunstein would answer that 
cost-benefit analysis is less useful the more abstract the problem. This 
is sound, but there is a complementary answer: Cost-benefit analysis 
can serve as a lingua franca of the administrative state that facilitates 
review of administrative decisions and helps to suppress idiosyncratic 
decisionmaking. Sunstein is not part of the administrative state and 
has little reason to couch most arguments in the form of cost-benefit 
analysis, but we may wish to require legal decisionmakers to do so. 
In this Review, I will illustrate Sunstein's conception of cost­
benefit analysis and critique this conception by suggesting that cost­
benefit analysis could serve a more important role than Sunstein 
would allow. Sunstein views cost-benefit analysis as a tool, one that 
any rational agency decisionmaker would choose regularly to use for 
concrete problems, just as any rational carpenter would use a hammer 
for driving nails into a wall. Those who oppose cost-benefit analysis 
are thus like those who recommend against hammering for driving 
nails, foolish and unlikely to be successful in pursuing their goals. 
There may be skeptics who fit into this metaphor, but opposition to 
cost-benefit analysis can be rational too, for someone whose valua­
tions of costs and benefits are different from others' and who thus 
worries about not being able to achieve policy goals when forced to 
calculate net benefits using the accepted scheme.6 This is, in my view, 
an argument for cost-benefit analysis rather than an argument against 
it. If properly implemented, cost-benefit analysis can push decision-
6. Cf Robert H. Frank, Why ls Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 913, 929-30 (2000) (arguing that many methods used in cost-benefit analysis are bi­
ased) . I do not intend to defend here any of the methodological commitments of cost-benefit 
analysts, but rather to defend cost-benefit analysis as a tool that would facilitate dialogue 
between courts and agencies about those commitments. 
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makers toward factoring in generally accepted valuations rather than 
their own idiosyncratic ones. This is a democratic benefit, producing 
results closer to what an informed body politic would decide. 
Though Sunstein and I agree on more about cost-benefit analysis 
than we disagree, our different conceptions of cost-benefit analysis 
have significant implications, particularly for how courts should review 
agency decisions. My analysis thus brings us back to Sunstein's 1989 
article7 concerning the aggressiveness of judicial review of agency de­
cisions. I argue for a more active judicial role in scrutinizing agency ac­
tions than Sunstein would recommend, though not necessarily a less 
deferential one. Where agencies can engage in cost-benefit analysis, 
judicial review can be more democratic and less likely to represent the 
arbitrary elevation of judicial preferences than if arguments are made 
without numbers. 
This Review will proceed as follows. Part I will outline Sunstein's 
defense of the role of cost-benefit analysis and his recommendations 
for implementing it. Part II considers how Sunstein envisions imple­
mentation of cost-benefit analysis, including the ways · in which 
Sunstein seeks to expand the practice and the ways in which he ulti­
mately would limit it. In Part III, I offer a broader vision of cost­
benefit analysis, recognizing the limitations of both unconstrained 
agency decisionmaking and unconstrained judicial decisionmaking. I 
argue that the development of cost-benefit principles through com­
mon law processes best avoids these opposing dangers. Finally, also in 
Part III, I argue that judicial review of cost-benefit analyses should 
take into account agency reputation and political proclivities as devel­
oped over a number of such analyses, as well as the political orienta­
tion of the courts in cases reviewing agency action. 
I. THREE CHEERS FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Sunstein's defense of cost-benefit analysis is sprinkled throughout 
the book, but several significant themes emerge. Cost-benefit analysis, 
Sunstein argues, is useful in forcing decisionmakers to consider all 
relevant factors, in improving the cognitive processes of decision­
makers, and in promoting democratic governance. Although I agree 
on all three counts, I believe these advantages are likely to be slight if 
cost-benefit analysis serves as a flexible mode of justification rather 
than as a rigid requirement. 
A. Consideration of All Relevant Factors 
Perhaps the most controversial word in the phrase "cost-benefit 
analysis" is "cost," and Sunstein emphatically argues that costs are a 
7. Sunstein, supra note 2. 
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critical consideration in regulatory decisionmaking. Costs may seem 
most vulnerable to critique when benefits and costs seem incommen­
surate,8 for example if lives are on one side of the balance and money 
is on the other. "[I]t might be possible to question," Sunstein acknowl­
edges, "whether a large amount of money (say, $400 million) would 
really be too much to spend to save a small number of lives (say, two)" 
(p. 21). Sunstein's response cites decisions that people make in their 
own lives. "Each of us has limited resources, and we do not spend all 
of our budget on statistically low risks. We spend a certain amount, 
and not more, to protect against the risks associated with poor diet, 
motor vehicle accidents, fires, floods, and much more" (p. 21). At 
some point, the cost of avoiding a risk is so high that individuals will 
take that risk, and so too, Sunstein believes, should the government. 
Although I find it persuasive, this argument is insufficient to meet 
Sunstein's goal. Sunstein insists that a "suitably devised system of 
[cost-benefit analysis or] CBA is for everyone," including, for exam­
ple, both "people who think that workers deserve much more protec­
tion and those who think that worker-protection programs have gone 
much too far."9 Sunstein characterizes his case for considering costs as 
"heavily pragmatic" (p. 21 ), without acknowledging that many are 
skeptical of pragmatic arguments, especially ones that seem to place 
greater focus on utility than on rights.10 Even many proponents of 
cost-benefit analysis would concede that the government should not 
cap spending to save an identifiable life, for example someone trapped 
in the rubble of a collapsed building.11 This concession, if made, pre­
vents the cost-benefit proponent from refusing to consider deontologi­
cal arguments, which might differ from utilitarian ones even when no 
identifiable lives are involved. 
Perhaps implicitly recognizing this counterargument, Sunstein re­
lies on a diluted defense of cost-benefit analysis, arguing that the exis­
tence of "health-health trade-offs" makes a money versus lives com­
parison too simplistic. For example, "fuel economy standards for new 
cars will lead manufacturers to produce smaller and more hazardous 
8. Sunstein himself has noted that incommensurability cannot excuse government from 
making decisions. See Cass R. Sunstein, lncommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 779, 780 (1994) (remarking that identification of incommensurability is "emphati­
cally not meant to deny the existence of grounds for evaluating private and public choices"). 
9. P. 20. Earlier in the book, Sunstein is more equivocal, acknowledging that "we lack 
full information" on whether cost-benefit analysis "actually produces what can be taken as 
policy improvements by people with diverse views about appropriate policy." P. 8. 
10. Sunstein does consider the issue of rights later in the book. See infra Section 11.B.2 
(discussing Sunstein's approach to the issue). 
11. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the 
Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (1984) ("[W]e readily ad­
mit that reliance upon cost-benefit analysis is not always appropriate where preexisting 
moral and legal rights are involved."). 
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vehicles, causing a number of deaths in the process" (p. 13). Similarly, 
"[f]lying is much safer than driving, and hence the FAA's measures 
might increase the number of lives lost on balance" (pp. ix-x). Even 
without a direct causal connection between regulation and health, 
"evidence suggests that high expenditures - of perhaps $15 million or 
more - will cause the loss of a statistical life, and hence that regula­
tions with high costs and low benefits may cause more deaths than 
they prevent."12 Governmental expenditures ultimately must be paid 
by taxes, and the distortions inherent in taxation may decrease wealth 
and indirectly cost lives. 
The identification of health-health trade-offs is a clever rhetorical 
tactic, with a substantive payoff in forcing someone whose maximand 
is health to consider some costs. It is not, however, sufficient to con­
vince "everyone" of the virtues of cost-benefit analysis, for two rea­
sons. First, a deontologist might argue that some effects of govern­
ment regulations on lives are more important than others. If, for 
example, government must treat everyone with equal concern and re­
spect, lives saved from improved conditions in the workplace may 
count more than lives lost because of decrease in wealth. Second, 
health-health trade-offs show only that some costs should be consid­
ered. Perhaps Sunstein would prefer a form of cost-benefit analysis in 
which lives are valued at $15 million each to one in which costs are not 
considered at all, but absent new evidence on the appropriate valua­
tion of life, this approach would produce decisions that he himself 
would reject. 
My point is not that agencies should ignore costs, or that pragmatic 
arguments are unreliable. To the contrary, Sunstein's arguments suc­
ceed at convincing me, but I am in the choir. The problem is that if 
Sunstein's arguments persuade only those who share his pragmatic 
framework, then they will not encourage increased reliance on cost­
benefit analysis among others. Contrary to Sunstein, consideration of 
costs is not for everyone. Sunstein promises to convince both "com­
mitted environmentalists and those who think of environmentalism as 
a form of hysteria" (p. 21). An environmentalist, however, might be­
lieve that treating the earth as a commodity to be placed in the bal­
ance is morally wrong, no matter what.13 A rejection of cost-benefit 
analysis seems appropriate on these premises. Perhaps we should 
12. P. 29 n.4 (citing ROBERT w. HAHN ET AL., Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE 
MORTALITY? (2000)). Other studies examining this issue are W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk 
Analysis, in THE MORTALITY COSTS OF REGULATORY EXPENDITURES 5, 9-12 (W. Kip Vis­
cusi ed., 1994); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 
RISK ANALYSIS 147 (1990); Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety­
Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. INQ. 599 (1999); Aaron Wildavsky, Richer Is Safer, PUB. 
INT., Summer 1980, at 23. 
13. See, e.g., AL GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN 
SPIRIT 192-93 (1992). 
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force such an individual, if placed in a policymaking role, to consider 
costs, but an argument for doing so cannot be made on terms appeal­
ing to all. 
Ordinarily, it is no defect for a book to fail to persuade some of its 
readers. But Sunstein's arguments that costs should be considered are 
circular. Of course we should consider costs, Sunstein seems to say; 
that's why we call them costs. Sunstein accordingly misses an opportu­
nity to make an institutional argument for cost-benefit analysis. Cost­
benefit analysis can force those who do not care about certain conse­
quences of governmental regulation to take them into account in 
making decisions. Such an argument would be no more appealing than 
Sunstein's to someone who does not wish to consider certain costs, but 
it does not purport to promise progress through force of logic alone. 
The stronger argument for considering costs is not that any rational 
person should agree to consider them, but that some people might not 
agree to consider certain costs even though the rest of us would like 
those costs to be considered. Cost-benefit analysis is useful not be­
cause consideration of costs is for everyone, but because it is not for 
everyone. 
B. Cognitive Correction 
Another virtue of cost-benefit analysis that Sunstein identifies is its 
ability to overcome cognitive problems attributable to imperfections 
in how individuals think about risk. A variety of heuristics could affect 
regulation and produce systematic biases in regulation,1 4 but Sunstein 
focuses especially on the "availability heuristic" (p. 26). Sunstein ex­
plains, "we tend to think that an event is more probable if an example 
is cognitively 'available,' in the sense that it comes easily to mind" 
(p. 26). For example, the publicity surrounding the Love Canal haz­
ardous waste problem in the 1970s led to considerable public concern 
about hazardous waste dumps, which "can be a serious health hazard, 
but . . .  cannot possibly be ranked among the most pressing environ­
mental issues."1 5 Similarly, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 
because so prominent in individuals' thoughts and experiences, led 
people to be "far more fearful than the facts warranted" (p. 26). 
The rigor of cost-benefit analysis may expose the weaknesses in 
conclusions influenced by heuristics. Sunstein notes that "people tend 
to be 'intuitive toxicologists,' making a number of errors about toxic 
14. Mark Seidenfeld has recently offered a comprehensive analysis of how cognitive bi­
ases might affect judicial review of agency action. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, 
Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 
(2002). 
15. P. 26. For a book arguing that the public did not overreact to Love Canal, see 
ADELIN GORDON LEVINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE (1982). 
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substances, such as, for example, how likely it is that those exposed to 
a carcinogen will get cancer" (p. 9). Cost-benefit analysis, he argues, 
"helps to ensure that these errors are not translated into regulatory 
policy" (p. 9). Why base policies on intuitive toxicologists rather than 
on actual toxicologists whom an agency can hire? Similarly, the avail­
ability heuristic may lead individuals to focus on the worst case with­
out considering this scenario's small probability of occurrence. Cost­
benefit analysis, according to Sunstein, "should help government resist 
demands for regulation that are rooted in a kind of hysteria" (p. 9). 
The problem, Sunstein recognizes, may operate in either direction. 
"When people understate the risks associated with poor diet and lack 
of exercise and overstate the risks associated with pesticides and air 
travel, it is often because the availability heuristic leads them astray" 
(p. 9). Cost-benefit analysis is a "natural corrective," because it "gives 
people a more accurate sense of the level of risks" (p. 9). 
Two possible arguments emerge from these examples. The premise 
to both is that individuals will sometimes support regulations (or fail 
to push for regulations) for reasons that do not make sense. The first 
argument is that cost-benefit analysis may help by making people less 
likely to demand bad regulatory outcomes. Perhaps publicity about 
cost-benefit analyses would provide a counterweight to the availability 
heuristic, so that, for example, television reports on hypothetical 
studies concluding that improved airport security would be extraordi­
narily expensive and provide little benefit would compete with reports 
on airplane accidents. This argument, however, seems weak, for cost­
benefit analysis is unlikely to achieve the salience of an accident; in­
deed, the generally low salience of arguments and studies is the reason 
that the availability heuristic is of such concern. 
Sunstein thus must be focusing on a second argument, that cost­
benefit analysis will make government officials less likely to pay atten­
tion to the demand for regulation. Government officials themselves 
may be caught up in the availability cascades1 6 that affect ordinary citi­
zens, and cost-benefit analysis can serve to remind them of what they 
ought to be thinking about. Certainly, it is plausible that bureaucrats, 
like politicians and voters, would respond naturally to crises by seek­
ing to provide solutions, and that by default they might focus more on 
that task than on careful evaluation of forward-looking policy argu­
ments. The observation, however, can be taken only so far. The avail­
ability heuristic is less likely to affect a policy official at the FAA than 
an ordinary citizen, because studies and analyses will compete with 
anecdotal evidence for the official's attention. On the margins, cost-
16. For a description of such cascades, see Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades are Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). Whether the availability heuris­
tic leads to a cascade may depend in part on whether activists choose to call attention to the 
available phenomenon. Id. at 713. 
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benefit analysis might help direct bureaucrats to important considera­
tions, thus reducing whatever contamination the availability heuristic 
otherwise would impose, and perhaps cost-benefit analysis might help 
address what cognitive psychologists call the self-serving bias,1 7 by 
making bureaucrats less likely to assume that their proposals will be 
satisfactory solutions. But the very creation of administrative agencies 
and of any processes by which proposals are considered and debated 
will tend to address these problems, regardless of whether costs and 
benefits are quantified or merely assessed qualitatively. 
A refined argument might focus not on the availability heuristic, 
which seeks to explain why people might focus on certain information, 
but on institutional norms concerning an agency's goals. Even if 
agency officials are, unlike the general public, aware of the full range 
of considerations in a particular substantive area, norms may affect the 
weight given to different considerations. For example, in the air safety 
context, FAA administrators are likely to be aware of information 
relevant to issues like the cost of compliance with various initiatives 
and the relative safety of air and auto travel. Nonetheless, administra­
tors might feel that their institutional mission is not to maximize net 
benefits, but to maximize airplane safety. This may be because 
policymakers in the agency are likely to be experts in aviation safety, 
or because they feel that their success will be evaluated in terms of 
improvements in aviation safety. High compliance costs sometimes 
might even emerge as factors favoring a particular regulation, because 
such costs may lead the public to believe that the agency takes safety 
seriously.1 8 If an institutional norm makes the goal of an agency some­
thing other than maximizing net benefits, administrators will focus 
primarily on information relevant only to the maximand. Such admin­
istrators will act much like individuals afflicted by the availability heu­
ristic; the problem, though, is not cognitive, but one of incentives cre­
ated from the institutional norm. 
If this norms account of cost-benefit analysis has greater explana­
tory power than the availability heuristic account, then gently encour­
aging agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis will not help. Per­
haps, Sunstein might argue, the widespread practice of cost-benefit 
analysis might change how administrators think about the goals that 
they should be pursuing. We should not be too optimistic, however, 
17. See, e.g., David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 418 (1979) (documenting the self-serving bias). An example 
of self-serving bias occurs in civil litigation when parties' expectations of trial outcomes are 
systematically different, with plaintiffs predicting higher awards than defendants. See, e.g., 
George Lowenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993). 
18. Agency officials may also increase their own power and budgets by favoring regula­
tion. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1971) (arguing that agencies generally seek to expand their budgets). 
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about government's ability to change institutional norms by adding 
procedural requirements.19 Agency officials might retain the goals that 
they would have had in the absence of cost-benefit analysis and see 
such analysis as a hurdle. The availability heuristic makes this more 
likely, as agency officials seek to respond to what the public afflicted 
by this heuristic wants. Cost-benefit analysis may be a useful hurdle, 
but if it is merely one among many that agency officials encounter, it is 
unlikely to be a high one. Once again, Sunstein's arguments might 
provide strong reason to use cost-benefit analysis as a check on agen­
cies, but in the absence of a binding constraint, we should not be con­
fident that agency officials, once given the gift of cost-benefit analysis, 
will choose to conduct their tasks in a significantly different way than 
before. 
C. Democracy-Advancing 
Sunstein's summary of the democratic virtues of cost-benefit 
analysis is directly related to his argument on cognition. Indeed, Sun­
stein argues that "the case for CBA is strengthened by the fact that in­
terest groups are often able to use these cognitive problems strategi­
cally, thus fending off desirable regulation or pressing for regulation 
when the argument on its behalf is fragile" (p. 9). "Often purportedly 
public-interest measures," Sunstein argues, "are really a bow in the di­
rection of self-interested agents" (pp. 27-28). As examples, Sunstein 
cites the Clean Air Act, which may have benefited eastern coal pro­
ducers at the expense of western producers,20 as well as "the farm 
lobby's support of ethanol" (p. 28). Cost-benefit analysis, Sunstein ex­
plains, '�could be a big help, because it would draw attention to the 
right questions" (p. 28). This would be persuasive if we believe that in­
terest groups succeed at achieving welfare-reducing regulation by dis­
tracting administrators from relevant information. Interest group the­
ory, however, puts relatively little weight on interest groups' ability to 
filter information that decisionmakers receive.21 Interest groups are 
powerful primarily because officials, for electoral and other reasons, 
want to cater to their interests. It would be naive to count on cost­
benefit analysis to persuade officials otherwise inclined to give interest 
19. For an experimental model assessing the extent to which the government might be 
able to change a social norm, see Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A 
Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (1997). 
20. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COALJDIRTY AIR 
(1981). 
21. But cf Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 166 (1998) ("[T]he views of the nth business group may seem 
redundant, whereas the input from a single consumer group may provide useful new infor­
mation."). 
1718 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1708 
groups what they want, unless the results of cost-benefit analysis are 
binding on officials. 
Sunstein's democratic defense of cost-benefit analysis is incom­
plete. Whether cost-benefit analysis accords with democratic values 
depends, of course, on how those values are defined. If democracy is 
equated with whatever the people want, then cost-benefit analysis is, if 
anything, counterproductive. If, on the other hand, results count as 
being democratic if they are what the people would want if they had 
full opportunity to consider individual questions, Sunstein's argument 
for increased use of cost-benefit analysis is more powerful, though still 
limited. Sunstein's emphasis on overcoming problems with the admin­
istrative state suggests that his ambition is to avoid the negative reper­
cussions of democratic government, to move past "what has been 
called a system of simultaneous 'paranoia and neglect.' "22 Democratic 
government, Sunstein recognizes, is prone to push too hard in some 
areas and not hard enough in others, and Sunstein hopes that the tool 
of cost-benefit analysis will improve rationality. Perhaps so, but it is 
hard to avoid seeing in Sunstein's optimism a reminder of the Progres­
sives at the dawn of the administrative state, who were confident that 
insulated experts and careful procedures would combine to produce 
sound apolitical judgments.23 Cost-benefit analysis, like agency inde­
pendence and notice-and-comment processes, might improve adminis­
trative outputs, but it will not lead to the objective exercise of exper­
tise. 
Sunstein might have attempted a different sort of democratic de­
fense of cost-benefit analysis, one based on equality principles. The 
defense would have emphasized that cost-benefit analysis typically 
considers people's willingness to pay for goods, including how much 
individuals would pay to avoid the risk of death. Sunstein suggests 
sympathy to the willingness-to-pay approach (pp. 77-80). If methodo­
logical difficulties can be overcome,24 a cost-benefit analysis using this 
approach has the virtue of allowing aggregation of costs and benefits 
across individuals. While tolerating non-Pareto-improving regulation, 
cost-benefit analysis thus has the potential to serve at least as a re­
quirement of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,2 5 approving of regulations 
22. Pp. 137, 138 n.13 (quoting John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk, in RISKS, COSTS, 
AND LIVES SAVED 183, 183 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996)). 
23. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 75-76, 154-55 (1938). 
24. For an examination of some of the issues, see Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource 
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989). See also Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk 
ls Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (1999) (questioning the conceptual 
foundation of the contingent valuation approach). 
25. A policy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if in theory the gainers could have compensated 
the losers so that no one's welfare would decrease. For criticism of the use of this criterion, 
see Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 
28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 252-53 (2000). 
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whenever those who benefit would be willing, in theory, to make side 
payments to those who suffer from regulatory outcomes. If a regime of 
cost-benefit analysis along these lines were enforced, with agencies re­
quired to sum up costs incurred and benefits in the form of willingness 
to pay, cost-benefit analysis would help prevent the types of regulatory 
failures that concern Sunstein, making both availability cascades and 
policies designed to benefit interest groups at the expense of the polity 
less likely. 
Sunstein, however, does not embrace this sort of defense, and in­
deed he suggests that cost-benefit analysis should not be narrowly re­
stricted to willingness to pay. "Rather than private willingness to pay," 
Sunstein explains, "perhaps regulatory agencies should seek public 
judgments, as these are expressed in public arenas. Society should not 
be taken as some maximizing machine, in which aggregate output is all 
that matters" (p. 8; footnote omitted). Indeed, it seems plausible to ar­
gue that paternalistic regulations sometimes may be justified,26 that so­
ciety sometimes should value individuals' lives more than willingness 
to pay,2 7 or that agencies should take into account that some people's 
preferences are distorted.2 8 Such an argument could even be made on 
the basis of equality, focusing on the uncomfortable implication of the 
willingness-to-pay approach that the lives of the wealthy should be 
valued more than those of the poor.29 What Sunstein does not ac­
knowledge, though, is that the more we are willing to allow agency of­
ficials' judgments of social welfare to count in cost-benefit analysis, the 
less of a claim cost-benefit analysis has to improving democracy. At 
the least, as the methodology of cost-benefit analysis becomes less 
constrained, arguments for institutional limits become more persua­
sive. 
In the end, Sunstein and I may simply disagree about the potential 
for truly deliberative democracy. In recent years, Sunstein has worked 
on the phenomenon of group polarization, which refers to the ten-
26. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229 (1998) (pro­
viding an economic defense of paternalistic regulation). 
27. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 189, 194-95 (2000) (noting that proponents of cost-benefit analysis often recommend 
using average aversion to risk as bases for valuing statistical lives to avoid discriminating 
against individuals who "value" their lives less than average). 
28. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000) (considering how agencies should 
respond to a variety of different forms of distorted preferences). "A person's preferences are 
distorted when his or her satisfaction does not enhance that person's well-being." Id. at 1105. 
For example, preferences may be based on a lack of information. Id. 
29. Sunstein expressly recognizes this problem. "Poor people often have little ability and 
hence little willingness to pay. Fortunately, agencies typically use a uniform number per life 
saved." Pp. 8-9. 
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dency of groups to move toward extremes.3° For example, Sunstein has 
shown how mock juries will tend to move in deliberation to more con­
demnatory judgments.31 Yet Sunstein has retained faith in group de­
liberation, pointing to experiments indicating that deliberation among 
people of opposing views can lead to moderate judgments.32 Adminis­
trative agencies may be examples of the group polarization phenome­
non, especially when they are comprised of a group of like-minded de­
cisionmakers, who may share a goal different from maximization of 
net benefits. Perhaps Sunstein sees cost-benefit analysis as a tool that 
helps achieve consensus by forcing decisionmakers into a conversation 
with objective data. I am, however, skeptical of cost-benefit analysis's 
ability to perform this democratic function if cost-benefit analysis is a 
flexible tool that decisionmakers may employ without constraint. 
II. SUNSTEIN'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
So far, I have detailed and endorsed Sunstein's case for cost­
benefit analysis, but I have not yet described just how Sunstein imag­
ines that agencies would employ cost-benefit analysis. In this Part, I fill 
in these details, showing how Sunstein's analysis for the most part 
leaves cost-benefit analysis far less of a constraint on agency action 
than it might be. In Section II.A, I explain ways in which Sunstein 
would expand cost-benefit analysis beyond its current state, although 
not as far as it might be expanded. In Section II.B, I identify ways in 
which Sunstein would allow agencies to employ cost-benefit analysis in 
a flexible way. Both sections further the critique that cost-benefit 
analysis would provide only a minimal constraint on agency decision­
making. 
A. Expanding Cost-Benefit Analysis 
1. Statutory Interpretation 
Sunstein recognizes that statutory guidelines for administrative 
agencies, as interpreted by the courts, run the gamut for the permissi­
bility of cost-benefit analysis. The most restrictive statutes "appear to 
forbid any consideration of cost" (p. 12) or even the magnitude of 
benefits. Examples of these types of statutes include the Delaney 
Clause's longtime prohibition on food additives that "induce cancer in 
30. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
YALE L.J. 71 (2000). 
31. See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About, 
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000). 
32. See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 116-18. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE 
OF THE PEOPLE 161-81 (1997) (describing deliberative polling). 
May 2002] Cost-Benefit Analysis 1721 
man or animal"33 and the Clean Air Act, long interpreted to be based 
on "public health" alone and thus not permitting agencies to consider 
compliance costs. 34 Some statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, provide for regulation of "significant" or "unacceptable" 
risks, thus appearing to focus on the magnitude of the risk but not on 
the cost of decreasing the risk. 35 Other statutes, such as the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, require agencies to consider substitute risks, 
what Sunstein labels as "health-health trade-offs,"36 but do not require 
consideration of costs other than negative health effects. Still other 
statutes require regulation "to the extent feasible" or "achievable," 
thus apparently considering costs only if they are such that an industry 
is technically or economically unable to implement a regulation with­
out significant business failures (p. 14). Sunstein also describes bal­
ancing test statutes that require agencies to "take into consideration" 
various factors, though perhaps at different stages of the analysis, 37 
and finally statutes that explicitly require consideration of costs and 
benefits, though perhaps not cost-benefit analysis itself.38 
While taking seriously the congressional instructions embedded in 
these standards, Sunstein recognizes that such standards are vague and 
that the process of judicial interpretation may make them more ra­
tional. For example, Sunstein describes and defends court decisions 
exempting trivial risks from regulation despite apparently inconsistent 
standards. In Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy,39 the D.C. Circuit indicated 
that an agency could allow a food additive if there is so little migration 
into the food "as to present no public health or safety concerns."40 
"When the benefits of regulation are trivial," Sunstein writes, "no one 
is likely to have anything to complain about" in the absence of regula­
tion (p. 58). Similarly, Sunstein notes the plurality opinion in the 
Benzene Case41 concluded that even though the key statutory language 
seemed to require that "no employee . . .  suffer" from benzene, com­
mon sense indicated that Congress did not intend to require costly 
regulation of relatively trivial risks. 42 
These are sensible conclusions even from a statutory interpretation 
perspective because none of the relevant statutes provides clear indi-
33. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). 
34. P. 12 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994)). 
35. P. 13 (discussing Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)). 
36. P. 13; see also text accompanying note 12 supra. 
37. P. 14 (discussing, inter alia, OSHA, 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a)(2) (1994)). 
38. Pp. 14-15 (discussing, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994)). 
39. 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
40. Id. at 955. 
41. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
42. Pp. 34-35 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994)). 
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cations to the contrary. No statute, for example, provides explicitly 
that agencies should not consider costs, no matter how high. Even if a 
statute provides for regulation of "significant" or "unacceptable" risks, 
without mentioning costs, an interpretation of "significant" and "un­
acceptable" as implicitly including consideration of costs seems rea­
sonable. For example, the word "induce" in the Delaney Clause could 
be conceptualized as including a magnitude component. The terms 
"feasible" and "achievable" could be interpreted as including all costs, 
and not just extreme costs like agency failure. 
Sunstein, however, is not as forceful in his advocacy of statutory in­
terpretations favoring cost-benefit analysis as he might be. According 
to Sunstein, courts should presume an agency interpretation unrea­
sonable "if it interprets the statute to fail to make de minimis exemp­
tions, to disallow health-health trade-offs, not to consider costs or fea­
sibility, to regulate insignificant risks, or to ban cost-benefit balancing" 
(p. 65). But if the various statutory standards are generally sufficiently 
vague to allow the courts to impose such presumptions, there is a 
strong argument that they are also sufficiently vague to support a 
stronger presumption that statutes require regulation only where 
benefits exceed costs. Such a presumption need not amount to a re­
quirement that agencies conduct a cost-benefit analysis, a procedural 
requirement that is probably beyond the courts' authority to de­
mand,43 but it would reflect at least the common sense notion that 
agencies should compare the advantages and disadvantages of their 
regulatory approaches. Sunstein is surely right to admit that the cost­
benefit principles he is advocating are not yet recognized canons of 
construction (p. 64), but as long as he is in advocacy mode, why not 
urge a presumption that all consequences of agency actions be consid­
ered rather than a series of lesser presumptions? 
Sunstein's reluctance to urge more aggressive interpretation is 
perhaps most apparent in his discussion of American Trucking,44 in 
which he appears to agree with the Court's conclusion that the stat­
ute's "adequate margin .. . requisite to protect the public health" 
standard was unambiguous in preventing the agency from considering 
costs.45 He could have critiqued the Court more forcefully for its 
statement that "we find it implausible that Congress would give to the 
EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether 
implementation costs should moderate national air quality stan­
dards."46 An opposing argument would find it implausible that 
43. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that the courts cannot add to the requirements of the Administra­
tive Procedure Act). 
44. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
45. P. 49 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994)). 
46. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 468. 
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Congress would use these elliptical phrasings to mean that agencies 
should not consider costs. Indeed, that is at the heart of Sunstein's case 
for clear statement rules;4 7 if statutes are ambiguous, those ambiguities 
might as well be resolved by the presumption that Congress has meant 
to act sensibly. Sunstein's embrace of cost-benefit analysis suggests 
that comparison of benefits and costs would be sensible, yet he does 
not urge a clear statement rule nearly as broadly as he might. 
Perhaps Sunstein simply does not see as much ambiguity in the 
statute as I do, and it is difficult to argue coherently about how am­
biguous an ambiguous statutory phrase is, but something else may be 
at work. In particular, for Sunstein, a regime in which agencies are 
permitted to consider costs and benefits is almost as good as or maybe 
even better than one in which they are required to do so. Sunstein 
embraces Justice Breyer's statement in concurrence in American 
Trucking that courts generally should permit consideration of costs, 48 
without addressing whether that is likely to have a substantial impact 
on policy. Meanwhile, in discussing one case that could be read as re­
quiring cost-benefit balancing, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Corrosion 
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 49 Sunstein does not explicitly disagree, but does 
call the opinion "especially aggressive" (p. 48) and, later, "exception­
ally aggressive" (p. 49). Certainly, the opinion is more aggressive than 
those that Sunstein embraces, but it is presumably too aggressive, as 
Sunstein implies, only if the costs of more aggressive review are 
greater than the benefits. Perhaps Sunstein believes that the benefits 
of aggressive review are not that great. 
2. Judicial Review 
In detailing his Clean Air Act example, Sunstein considers a range 
of approaches that courts might take to individual EPA decisions. 
Much of his analysis is quite general, suggesting that he would take a 
similar approach in other regulatory contexts. The loosest form of ju­
dicial review that Sunstein discusses is a "soft look,'' a phrase that is an 
obvious contrast with the "hard look" review that courts often apply 
to agency decisions.50 Discussing ozone regulation, Sunstein concludes, 
"perhaps a court should say that there is much scientific uncertainty 
here, and that the EPA should be allowed to resolve the doubts as it 
47. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (dis­
cussing various clear statement rules used by the Supreme Court). 
48. P. 49 (citing Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 488 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
49. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
50. Perhaps the most prominent case applying the hard look doctrine is Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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sees fit" (p. 125). Such a soft look is soft indeed, apparently permitting 
judicial rejection of an agency decision only if the agency decision is 
wrong to a scientific certainty. While not explicitly endorsing the ap­
proach, Sunstein offers no criticisms of it, and indeed comments that it 
has "several advantages," particularly avoiding the delay that judicial 
review can create.51 
Sunstein's enthusiasm for the least rigorous form of judicial review 
that he considers is balanced by similar enthusiasm for the most rigor­
ous form that he considers, a requirement that agencies explain why 
they have adopted particular regulations rather than stricter or more 
lenient ones. As Sunstein notes, although American Trucking pre­
cluded such a doctrine as a matter of constitutional law, it did not do 
so as a matter of administrative law (p. 127). Indeed, he notes that 
such judicial review might come in two flavors. First, the court might 
claim that it cannot in the absence of further explanation know 
whether the standard set by the statute is met (p. 127). Second, "the 
court might . . .  say that it cannot tell whether the agency's action is 
arbitrary or capricious, within the meaning of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, unless the EPA has given a more detailed explanation 
of its choice. " 52 Sunstein thus pulls an old administrative law trick, 
voiding a regulation on the basis that the courts cannot perform judi­
cial review in the absence of further explanation.53 
This trick, Sunstein properly insists, would be "a genuine innova­
tion" (p. 127), pushing agencies toward quantitative rather than quali­
tative analysis of regulation. There would, however, be' an irony to 
courts requiring additional explanation so that they can provide judi­
cial review if, once they are given the information, the judicial review 
that they will perform consists of little more than a "soft look." The 
approach would ensure that the agency itself was sure that it wanted 
to enact the regulation, but not assess whether the regulation was in 
fact worth enacting. This strategy will not push agencies to weigh costs 
and benefits in the same way as other agencies or as informed practi­
tioners of cost-benefit analysis would choose to weigh them, but it 
would produce the same delay that Sunstein decries. Often, when an 
agency vigorously defends a regulation in court, it will respond to a 
remand with a result similar to the initial one, especially if its only task 
51. P. 125. ("A serious problem with intense judicial review of agency action is that it 
creates delay - and hence ensures a bias in favor of the status quo." (citing JERRY L. 
MASHAW & DAVID L. HARSFT, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990))). 
52. P. 127 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)). 
53. See, e.g. , Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding 
that in informal adjudication, agency administrators cannot be required to explain the basis 
of their decisions, but that if they do not do so, the court must order discovery to determine 
what the basis was). 
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it to provide a more detailed explanation.5 4  Imposing such a modest 
requirement of explanation might improve the rationality of agency 
decisionmaking sufficiently to justify such delays, but such a limited 
approach gives up any hope of forcing determined agencies to avoid 
costly regulatory mistakes. 
B. Allowing Flexibility in Cost-Benefit Analysis 
1. Qualitative Considerations Trumping Analysis 
One of the most surprising concessions that Sunstein makes is his 
conclusion that even when agencies are required to engage in cost­
benefit analysis, they sometimes should decide to enact regulations 
that fail the cost-benefit test. "Cost-benefit analysis ought not to place 
agencies in an arithmetic straightjacket," he explains. "[R]egulators 
might reasonably decide that the numbers are not decisive if, for ex­
ample, children are mostly at risk, or if the relevant hazard is faced 
mostly by poor people, or if the hazard at issue is involuntarily in­
curred or extremely difficult to control" (p. 22). It is significant that 
Sunstein expects an explanation when cost-benefit .numbers are ig­
nored, but it is peculiar that he does not require a quantification of the 
explanation. The factors that he identifies as justification for failing to 
follow the results of a cost-benefit analysis may be significant, but 
Sunstein does not explain why he does not believe that cost-benefit 
analysis is sufficiently robust to handle them.5 5  
Sunstein's argument might make sense if he conceived of cost­
benefit analysis as a rigid summation of willingness to pay, for then the 
categories of "costs" and "benefits" would not exhaust the universe of 
considerations. We have seen, however, that Sunstein is willing to al­
low public judgments to figure in cost-benefit analysis, 5 6  and the con­
siderations that he mentioned could be factored into such an analysis. 
If children are more likely than adults to be among the lives lost, the 
cost-benefit analysis could be adjusted, as Sunstein recognizes, to con­
sider "life-years" lost, rather than lives lost.57 Perhaps a pure life-years 
analysis, though, does not do a perfect job of accommodating our in-
54. For a preliminary empirical analysis of whether agencies change their original posi­
tion after remand, see Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1048-49 & tbl.18. 
55. One plausible argument against the net benefits criterion is that the proper approach 
is to consider marginal costs and benefits. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regula­
tion: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health and Safety 
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 990-96 (2001). A careful cost-benefit analysis of all plausi­
ble alternatives, however, should lead to the selection of the alternative for which marginal 
benefits equal marginal costs. 
56. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
57. P. 119 (discussing quality adjusted life-years). 
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tuitions. Maybe, as Richard Revesz has implied and as Sunstein con­
siders, children's lives should be valued more because the risks that 
they face are involuntary.58 Or, perhaps we value a year of childhood 
at more than a year at older ages. 59 Further refinements of cost-benefit 
analysis, though, could take these considerations into account. Agen­
cies may not be able to calculate perfectly how much each life-year 
should be worth, in part because there is no right answer, but they 
could do their best and respect the numeric results. 
Similarly, consider arguments that agencies should take into ac­
count the distributional effects of their actions. "Sometimes a regula­
tion producing $5 million in benefits but $6 million in costs will be 
worthwhile," Sunstein argues, "if those who bear the costs (perhaps 
representing dollar losses alone?) are wealthy and can do so easily, 
and if those who receive the benefits (perhaps representing lives and 
illnesses averted?) are especially needy" (p. 8). This statement con­
founds the distributional issue with the issue of whether it is appropri­
ate to value life.60 Moreover, it should be possible to produce a calcu­
lation determining whether the distribution would be appropriate. 
One benchmark would be the deadweight cost associated with redis­
tribution programs.61 If the government theoretically could accomplish 
a redistribution from the rich to the poor to compensate for a distribu­
tional effect of a regulation in the other direction for less money than 
the regulation's net benefits, for example by enacting a new entitle­
ment program, the distributional claim is weak.62 
58. See pp. 80-81; Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 968-71 (1999). 
59. See Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12-13 (1976) (noting that a year of good health may be more valu­
able than a year of bad health). 
60. Sunstein's implication in the parentheticals is perplexing, as perhaps he acknowl­
edges with the insertion of question marks. The parentheticals suggest that even once valua­
tions are placed on lives or illnesses, we might still consider a $1 million financial loss to be 
preferable to a $1 million loss that reflects illness or risk of death. The point of valuing lives 
and illnesses, however, is to make them comparable to ·pure dollar losses, so if lives and ill­
nesses are valued appropriately (placing the distributional issue aside), society should be 
truly indifferent between these alternatives. See also p. 59 (offering similarly flawed logic). 
61. There are two categories of cost. The first is the deadweight cost associated with in­
creases in taxation, from tax enforcement costs and tax avoidance, and possibly decreased 
incentives to work (depending on the relative magnitude of income and substitution effects). 
See, e.g., Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Wel­
fare Costs of Taxes in the United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128 (1985) (discussing calcula­
tion of deadweight costs of marginal increases in taxation). The second is the administrative 
costs and other inefficiencies associated with programs designed to give money to the poor. 
See, e.g., Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (comparing the costs of administering the 
earned income tax credit with those of administering other welfare programs). 
62. This may often be true. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE 
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULA TORY STATE 39 (1992) 
("Economic regulatory programs are simply not effective ways to achieve equity goals."). 
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An agency also could attempt to put a price on distributional ef­
fects. There is no theoretical reason that a dollar benefit to a rich per­
son must count in the social calculus as no less than a dollar or that a 
dollar cost to a poor person must count in the social calculus as no 
greater than a dollar. An agency could develop a table translating 
nominal increases or decreases in the bank accounts of individuals of 
different incomes into costs and benefits from a social point of view.63 
Such judgments might be controversial, especially if, for example, an 
agency followed Sunstein in considering placing special weight on 
losses suffered by African Americans (p. 81). But at least it would 
force agencies to candidly acknowledge trade-offs and value judg­
ments. Moreover, it would alert the public to the identities of any 
groups receiving special attention and possibly spark a debate on 
whether the choice is appropriate. 
These are, admittedly, just two of many complications that a cost­
benefit analysis might encounter. Perhaps, Sunstein might argue, there 
are some adjustments that would be far more difficult to quantify with 
any reasonable methodology. A minimal requirement that one might 
impose then would be to require an agency to explain not only why it 
is disregarding the results of a cost-benefit analysis, but also why a 
consideration that it believes is sufficiently relevant to change the re­
sult cannot be adequately quantified. There is a strong argument, 
however, that even if an agency cannot come up with any methodol­
ogy to measure some factor that it deems relevant, it should be re­
quired nonetheless to plug in some number that it claims is its best es­
timate. The cost of doing so is close to zero. The benefits, however, 
could be significant. It would make it more difficult for an agency to 
offer a bogus reason for ignoring a cost-benefit analysis, assuming 
agency officials would be concerned about the reputational conse­
quences of making absurd assessments of purportedly unquantifiable 
variables. More significantly, it would assure cost-benefit analysis a 
more prominent place in the regulatory process, preventing it from 
becoming lost as just one consideration. 
Whether a flexible cost-benefit analysis that takes into account all 
factors is ultimately superior to a rigid cost-benefit analysis that ig­
nores some important dimensions to regulatory policy is a difficult 
question. Sunstein notes, "Of course, it is possible to think that we 
lack the tools to engage in a good incidence analysis, or that an as­
sessment of distributional issues will be subject to interest-group ma­
nipulation, and hence that the 'bottom line' numbers should be used 
63. It might be appropriate for such a table to take into account not only differences in 
income, but also the phenomenon of loss aversion. Even to a single person, and even ac­
counting for the declining marginal utility from wealth, a one-dollar loss may have a greater 
effect on utility than a one-dollar gain. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Pros­
pect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979). 
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for pragmatic reasons" (p. 82). Perhaps once we admit distributional 
concerns into the cost-benefit process, rather than just the political 
process, we open the way for abuse, and the same argument can be 
made regarding any variable for which measurement is difficult. Yet 
once we resolve this question in favor of considering distributional 
concerns, as Sunstein does, no sound reason recommends taking them 
into account qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Forcing quantifi­
cation (as well as, perhaps, qualitative explanation) seems more likely 
to prevent abuse than qualitative identification of factors alone.64 
2. Rights and Irreversibility 
Sunstein also seeks flexibility in cost-benefit analysis by suggesting 
that it might be trumped by considerations of rights and problems of 
irreversibility. Sunstein argues, "For example, the costs undoubtedly 
associated with politically controversial speech are not a legitimate ba­
sis for regulating such speech. Those costs are entitled to no weight at 
all; it is not as if they count but are insufficiently high" (p. 68). Sun­
stein's point, however, is not merely that the Constitution sometimes 
may constrain agencies. An agency ought not waste time on unconsti­
tutional regulations, and the doctrine of constitutional doubt counsels 
even against regulations that are arguably unconstitutional. 6 5  But this 
is an antecedent question for the agency to resolve before it even ar­
rives at cost-benefit analysis. Sunstein's point, rather, seems to be that 
even where regulation or its absence clearly would be constitutionally 
permissible, rights-like thinking sometimes should preclude balancing. 
As an example, Sunstein considers the Endangered Species Act, 6 6  
and postulates that "perhaps the statute is best taken to be rooted in a 
theory of rights, one that rebuts the presumption in favor of cost­
benefit balancing" (p. 68). The foundations of the statute, Sunstein ar­
gues, "lie in a judgment that human beings should not knowingly bring 
about the extinction of other species, at least in the absence of truly 
extraordinary circumstances" (p. 69; footnote omitted). In addition, 
64. This point is responsive to the following critique of cost-benefit analysis by Henry 
Richardson: " [I]f [cost-benefit analysis] ignores distributional issues it is unjust, while if it 
attempts to i11corporate distributional concerns by some scheme of weighting it is doomed to 
do so crudely and controversially." Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit 
Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971, 972-73 (2000). This argument fails to make a comparison 
between the last two of the following three possibilities: rigid cost-benefit analysis ignoring 
issues such as distribution, flexible cost-benefit analysis in which analysts do their best to 
quantify such issues, and no cost-benefit analysis at all. While flexible cost-benefit analysis 
may be crude, decisionmaking in the absence of any quantification is more so. 
65. When an agency's interpretation of a statute would present the possibility of consti­
tutional problems, courts will not defer to the agency's interpretation, even if it is otherwise 
a reasonable construction of the statute. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf 
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
66. 16 U.S .C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
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Sunstein notes that the Act "is concerned with preventing genuinely 
irreversible losses" (p. 68), Jurassic Park scenarios notwithstanding. 
Generalizing from the example, Sunstein concludes, "Where regula­
tory policy is designed to ensure against irreversible damage, or oth­
erwise to prevent the violation of rights, the cost-benefit default prin­
ciples might well be displaced" (p. 69). Coupled with Sunstein's 
expansive conception of rights, this opens the door to a potentially 
significant exception to cost-benefit balancing. 
Further, an exception where rights are at stake is inappropriate, for 
it assumes, wrongly, that rights have no place in cost-benefit analysis. 
Properly conceived, cost-benefit analysis is rooted not in utilitarian­
ism,67 but in a theory of politics. A deontologist might well conclude 
that the snail darter is worth thousands of jobs, but she should not 
object to enunciating her objection with numbers. She might even in­
dicate that the snail darter has infinite value, though that would sub­
ject her to critiques from people like Sunstein who would allow extinc­
tion at least in "truly extraordinary circumstances." The benefit of 
saving a species might be rated as very high even if there is no real 
possibility that the species would ever serve human needs in a par­
ticular way. Cost-benefit analysis need not preclude consideration of 
the pain of animals, the existence value of species, the beauty of the 
environment, or the rights of individuals. It would, however, force 
those who would advocate results on the basis of these considerations 
to identify the point, if any, at which these considerations should give 
way. This can only advance democratic dialogue in a world composed 
of deontologists, utilitarians, and people who believe that both rights 
and utility matter.68 
Nor should irreversibility be allowed to trump cost-benefit analy­
sis. There are many harms that are irreversible, the death of a person 
most prominent among them, and yet Sunstein would allow govern­
ment to avoid regulation on the ground that private activity will cost 
only a small number of lives.69 Sometimes, it might make sense for 
cost-benefit analyses to take irreversibility into account when the gov­
ernment's information is likely to improve. For example, suppose 
there is some scientific uncertainty about whether a certain plot of 
land is vital to an ecosystem, but there is reason to think that a 
sounder scientific understanding might be available in the future. 
67. See, e.g., p. 137 ("The best defense of cost-benefit analysis relies not on controversial 
claims from neoclassical economics, but on a simple appreciation of how we all make mis­
takes in thinking about risks . . . .  ") .  
68. Amartya Sen has argued that cost-benefit analysis allows for "[b]roadly consequen­
tial evaluation," which considers "not only such things as happiness or the fulfillment of de­
sire on which utilitarians tend to concentrate, but also whether certain actions have been 
performed or particular rights have been violated." Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost­
Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 936 (2000). 
69. See, e.g., p. 21 (indicating that $400 million is too much to save two lives). 
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Even if the best current guess is that the benefits of paving the plot for 
a Wal-Mart exceed the costs to the ecosystem, that is not the relevant 
question. The question is what are the costs and benefits of delay. The 
benefits would include the possibility that subsequent scientific infor­
mation would reveal that the cost-benefit analysis on the ultimate 
question of paving should go the other way. While Sunstein is right to 
point out that the phenomenon of irreversibility may be relevant to 
policy decisions, he is wrong to ignore the possibility that cost-benefit 
analysis itself could be used to determine whether delaying a decision 
might produce greater net benefits than immediate resolution in either 
direction. 
Ill. COST-BENEFIT BALANCING IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Although we have seen that Sunstein is cautious in evaluating the 
judicial role in cost-benefit analysis, his analysis is nonetheless useful 
in identifying legal strategies that courts might use to encourage quan­
tification more rigorously than he would demand. Although Chevron70 
deference requires courts to defer to reasonable constructions of 
agency statutes, Sunstein points out that courts remain free to scruti­
nize policy decisions by agencies in implementing statutes, either by 
requiring more information to facilitate judicial review or by per­
forming a "hard look" review.71 
The timing for the second strategy is particularly appropriate, as 
the courts increasingly focus on Chevron's Step 2, which inquires 
whether an agency's construction of a statute is reasonable. 72 Until re­
cently, most attention focused on Step 1, which inquires whether a 
statute is clear, in which case an agency must follow the statute.73 The 
Supreme Court's execution of Chevron analysis has focused almost en­
tirely on Step 1, 7 4  with the dual effect of making Step 2 seem unimpor-
70. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
71. P. 127. Without explicitly citing the hard look doctrine or Chevron Step 2, Sunstein 
notes that "these conclusions would be relatively conventional, and neither would mark a 
huge departure from current law." P. 127 
72. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 ("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permis­
sible construction of the statute."). 
73. Step 1 analysis can be quite complicated, particularly because of Chevron's admoni­
tion that a statute may become clear after consideration of the canons of statutory construc­
tion. Id. at 843 n.9. For a discussion of the role of canons in Chevron analysis, see Curtis A. 
Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 675-79 (2000). 
74. The only cases in which the Supreme Court arguably has invalidated a regulation on 
the basis of Step 2 are AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), and Whit­
man v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Even these cases could be clas­
sified as Step 1 cases, given the ambiguous borderline between Step 1 and Step 2. See Jim 
Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 105, 1 142 n.186 (2001). 
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tant and providing an opening for courts and commentators to offer 
suggestions. One suggestion, 7 5  which has the virtue of explaining the 
lack of attention to Step 2 in case law, was that Step 2 encapsulated 
the "hard look" doctrine, by which courts ensure that agencies con­
sider and answer all relevant arguments against the courses of action 
that they choose.76 The D.C. Circuit has seemed to adopt this sugges­
tion, increasing its significance. All this might be much ado about 
nothing - not a lot rests on whether hard look review is part of 
Chevron analysis or independent from it - but it provide a reminder 
that courts play a role in ensuring the rationality of agency decisions, 
even when Congress delegates power. 
Courts thus could, and I will argue should, use hard look review 
both to encourage cost-benefit analysis and to discipline the analyses 
that agencies offer. In making these suggestions, however, I do not 
contest Sunstein's position that the courts' posture should be one of 
deference. The question that I address is not how much deference the 
courts should give, but the type of reasoning that courts should em­
ploy in determining whether an agency's decision should receive def­
erence. Exploring how much deference courts should give is largely an 
empty exercise, for whatever verbal formulation guides the courts, ul­
timately the outcomes of cases will depend on the judgment of those 
on the bench.7 7 But the factors that judges consider in reviewing 
agency decisions are critical, because agencies will pay more attention 
to factors that judges consider more important. 
Thus, I do not recommend that courts strike down regulations 
merely because an agency has declined to use cost-benefit analysis. 
Rather, courts should be more favorable to agencies that make deci­
sions quantitatively than qualitatively, because quantitative assess­
ments provide more convincing demonstrations that agencies have 
sufficiently considered alternative approaches. Similarly, I do not be­
lieve that a court should strike down a regulation merely because it 
comes to a different conclusion about a particular variable in a cost­
benefit analysis, even if the court's best estimate of that variable 
would shift the cost-benefit analysis in the other direction. Rather, a 
75. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.­
KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997) (arguing that the courts should recognize Step 2 to be equivalent 
to "arbitrary and capricious" review); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasiz­
ing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEXAS L. 
REV. 83 (1994) (offering a similar proposal). 
76. The statutory basis for hard look review is 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994), providing for 
judicial review of "arbitrary" and "capricious" administrative action. 
77. Justice Frankfurter recognized this in refusing to offer a formula explaining how 
courts should apply the "substantial evidence" standard: "Since the precise way in which 
courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words, new 
formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the old." Uni­
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). 
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court should strike a regulation only if it can show that the agency 
acted unreasonably in making the conclusion that it did. That assess­
ment should depend in part on a comparison of the agency's justifica­
tion for its decision with evaluations of similar cost-benefit issues 
made by the courts in earlier cases. More controversially, I will argue 
that the assessment should depend also on a candid evaluation of the 
agency's reputation across a range of regulatory issues, and perhaps 
also the ideology of the judges who have considered the relevant is­
sues. Invalidation of a regulation should occur only when an agency 
consistently, within and across regulations, has shown a bias that devi­
ates from sound cost-benefit principles, as recognized and enunciated 
by judges across the political spectrum. 
A. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Aggressive Judicial Review 
An assessment of the virtues of judicial review of agency decisions 
must depend on an evaluation of relative institutional competence. 
Sunstein's work clearly reflects this, as despite his recognition of im­
perfections in the administrative state, he recommends against aggres­
sive judicial action. Sunstein does not, however, offer a full analysis. 
Moreover, his emphasis on the danger that aggressive judicial review 
will allow lawyers to object to almost any rulemaking elides two criti­
cal issues. First, it assumes that litigation itself is the evil to be avoided, 
rather than judicial decisions vacating agency decisions. While litiga­
tion costs are relevant, they may not be sensitive to the form of judi­
cial review. Second, it ignores that even if the overall intrusiveness of 
judicial review is held constant, the approach to judicial review that 
courts take may be important. In this section, I provide at least a pre­
liminary comparison of the dangers of unconstrained agency decision­
making and unconstrained judicial decisionmaking. 
1. The Problem with Unconstrained Agency Decisionmaking 
The danger of unconstrained agency decisionmaking is that it 
might lead to the elevation of the preferences of the agency officials 
over the preferences of the population at large. One aspect of this 
phenomenon is that agencies might stretch the meaning of statutes. 
Even though Chevron Step 1 requires agencies to abide by clear statu­
tory meaning, statutes are often ambiguous, and the more deferential 
judicial review, the more likely agencies will be to take advantage of 
such ambiguity to push regulation in their preferred direction. The 
danger, however, is also present even where Congress has expressly 
delegated authority to the agency, for example to the EPA to set am­
bient air quality standards. Agency officials, perhaps because of their 
own views on environmental law or perhaps influenced by the Presi­
dent or by interest groups, might choose standards that would be quite 
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different from those that the population at large, if fully engaged and 
informed in the debate, would choose. That there is no process that 
would lead to objective revelation of popular informed preferences 
does not make the danger of idiosyncratic agency decisionmaking any 
less acute. 
Sunstein does not confront this problem directly, and indeed he of­
fers a brief indication that he does not believe it to be a problem at all. 
In pressing the virtues of judicial deference, he states, "A special vir­
tue of this approach is that the Bush Administration would be permit­
ted to come to a different conclusion from the Clinton Administration, 
and vice versa, because different judgments of value could lead to dif­
ferent conclusions about how to proceed in the face of ambiguous sci­
ence" (p. 125). This seems to suggest approval of agency officials re­
solving scientific ambiguity not by their best guess of scientific 
unknowns, but by virtue of their ideological preferences. This is not 
quite the same as agency officials acting like the "intuitive toxicolo­
gists" that Sunstein seeks to have the administrative state overcome 
(p. 9), but it is close. Sunstein's reasoning implies that when adminis­
trative questions are difficult (and aren't all the interesting ones?), 
agency officials should feel free to act like intuitive Republicans or in­
tuitive Democrats. 
It is strange to me that Sunstein sees this as an unmitigated virtue. 
Perhaps he is reaching for an argument about relative institutional 
competence, recognizing the claim that administrative agencies may 
be more politically accountable than legislatures or courts. Jerry 
Mashaw has made such an argument, 7 8  and it provides a plausible de­
fense of judicial deference. It would be bizarre, however, to consider 
agency flexibility to base decisions on political views as an absolute 
plus, rather than as the lesser of two evils. Surely it would be better if 
agencies sought to reflect moderate political preferences rather than 
the preferences of any particular presidential administration. We 
would not be better off with liberal outcomes in Clinton administra­
tion decisions and conservative outcomes in Bush administration deci­
sions, if it were possible to have moderate outcomes in both. 
An objection to this argument is that by producing conservative re­
sults in Republican administrations and liberal results in Democratic 
ones (a simplification, of course), we end up with moderate results on 
average. The problem with this objection is that the average does not 
matter. For example, having excessively lenient standards for one 
pollutant regulated during a Republican administration and exces­
sively harsh standards for another pollutant regulated during a 
Democratic administration isn't as good as having standards that are 
just right. Moreover, this is true even from the perspective of someone 
78. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci­
sions, 1 J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 81 (1985). 
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who thinks that either the lenient or harsh approach would be just 
right for both chemicals. If given the chance to negotiate, advocates of 
the Republican and Democratic approaches probably would choose to 
have two moderate standards rather than one harsh and one lenient 
standard. This will be true as long as marginal costs from misaligned 
standards increase as standards become more misaligned. Designing 
an administrative law doctrine that tends to advance more moderate 
decisionmaking performs, in effect, the same function as this hypo­
thetical negotiation. 
2. The Problem with Unconstrained Judicial Decisionmaking 
I suspect that Sunstein is wary of judicial review not really because 
he believes that it is affirmatively good for the President to pursue 
without resistance regulation based on his own personal philosophy, 
but because Sunstein appropriately recognizes that there is a trade-off 
between unconstrained agencies and unconstrained courts. "A serious 
problem with intense judicial review of agency action," Sunstein warns 
us, "is that it creates delay - and hence ensures a bias in favor of the 
status quo" (p. 125). Delay occurs when a court vacates an agency de­
cision, and the threat of delay may well lead to an agency decision to 
weaken the initial thrust of the regulation. Sunstein is right that this 
may be a problem, but only when the regulation does more good than 
harm, or when the administrative cost of fixing it is greater than the 
benefit. A judicial decision to vacate a regulation may increase social 
welfare if the regulation would have decreased social welfare. And of 
course, cost-benefit analysis is a way of determining whether the 
regulation increases or decreases social welfare. 
Sunstein, though, is right to be concerned about judicial review, 
because courts may have no superior claim over agencies to being able 
to produce accurate cost-benefit analysis. Even if we assume that both 
the agency and the court will perform cost-benefit analysis in good 
faith, if a regulation independently must pass both the agency's and 
the court's test, the system will have the bias toward the status quo 
that worries Sunstein. If all that is needed to vacate a regulation is for 
courts to find a single defect in the agency's cost-benefit analysis, or a 
single point on which the court disagrees with the agency, then the 
status quo bias will be even more severe. The problem is exacerbated 
by the concern that judges may have political preferences too, and 
even further by the reality that different judges may have different 
political preferences. A substantial body of literature has shown that 
the political party affiliation of judges on the D.C. Circuit is a signifi­
cant variable in explaining the decisions of those judges in administra-
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tive law cases. 79 Thus, even if a goal of the administrative process is to 
produce moderate decisionmaking, there is a risk that judicial review 
could hurt rather than help, leaving the fate of regulations in the lot­
tery of the judicial selection wheel. 
These considerations are sufficient to caution against a regime in 
which courts conduct de novo review of agency actions on a case-by­
case basis, with each successive panel assessing the myriad issues of 
cost-benefit analysis anew and overturning the agency decision if costs 
exceed benefits. At the same time, they counsel against even a regime 
in which courts resolve issues and set precedents with stare decisis ef­
fect. In such a regime, one panel might decide that the appropriate 
value of a life is less than $7 million or that 5% is an acceptable dis­
count rate for lives expected to be lost in future generations, and other 
panels would be obliged to follow. This is troubling for the same rea­
son that we should not be happy with the Bush administration issuing 
conservative regulations and the Clinton administration issuing liberal 
ones. Having some variables resolved in a pro-regulation direction and 
others resolved in an anti-regulation direction seems unlikely to pro­
duce coherence. Perhaps en bane review could improve things, as a 
broader range of judges could consider the most important issues, but 
it is unlikely by itself to be a complete corrective.80 
B. Common Law Cost-Benefit Principles 
This does not, however, mean that we should give up altogether on 
the possibility of a common law of cost-benefit analysis that emerges 
in the courts. The development of such a common law would be help­
ful, with the caveat that neither panels nor agencies should be obliged 
to follow the decisions of past courts. This would be in the true spirit 
of the common law, in which precedents warranted epistemological 
deference if persuasively reasoned but did not provide legal principles 
that courts were obliged to follow in the absence of the intervention of 
79. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience 
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 
2173 (1998) (observing that politically aligned judicial panels on the D.C. Circuit are more 
likely than politically mixed panels to reach results consistent with the panels' apparent po­
litical orientation); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political 
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303-07 (assessing the effect of D.C. Circuit judges' ideology on the per­
formance of judicial review); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and 
the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1738-47 (1997) (demonstrating the influence of ideol­
ogy on the D.C. Circuit in environmental cases). But see Patricia M. Wald, A Response to 
Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 240 (1999) (disagreeing that the D.C: Circuit is 
political, but acknowledging that "the same life experiences that channel a judge's choice of 
political parties [may) also guide her judicial decisionmaking"). 
80. For an argument that even en bane courts may not be sufficiently politically repre­
sentative, see Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (2000). 
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a legislature or a higher judicial authority.81 In such a regime, courts 
would consider a full range of regulatory questions about cost-benefit 
analysis. They might consider, for example, whether people's concern 
for "relative position" should affect the valuation of life,82 whether a 
regulation's effect on the size of the population should be considered 
independently of its effect on lives in being,83 or the methodological 
issues involved in selecting an appropriate discount rate for adminis­
trative action.84 
The looseness of such a common law might seem to provide sup­
port for Sunstein's suggestion that a common law of cost-benefit 
analysis could emerge in agencies rather than in courts (p. 120). In­
deed, Sunstein is right to demand that agencies show consistency 
across regulations in performing cost-benefit analysis (pp. 120-21), for 
when an agency plugs in two different numbers for the same variable 
in two different regulatory contexts without explanation, a suspieion 
arises that the agency may be fudging numbers to· provide ex post ra­
tionalizations of desired policy outcomes. But this is a very limited 
common law, limited to a particular agency. Even a broader one re­
quiring agencies to explain inconsistencies with other agencies' ap­
proaches might not be sufficiently broad. Within any given presiden­
tial administration, a variety of agencies might choose a set of 
numerical values reflecting the President's ideological values. 
Moreover, individual agencies are unlikely to engage in debates on 
theoretical considerations in cost-benefit analysis. Courts are institu­
tionally well-suited to consider such abstract issues, even if they are 
not well-suited to declare values for particular variables to be used in 
cost-benefit analyses. There is an institutional point related to cogni­
tion here. Sometimes institutions are useful because they lead par­
ticular actors to use modes of thinking that otherwise might be ig­
nored. One justification for judicial review that avoids the 
countermajoritarian difficulty is that judges are more likely to think 
about constitutional issues than legislatures, for whom constitutional 
81. See generally Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1, 28-45 (2001) (discussing the role of precedent and the rise of the principle 
of stare decisis in the nineteenth century). 
82. See Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Posi­
tion, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001) (arguing that because relative income is an important 
factor in individual well-being, higher statistical values of life should be used when a regula­
tion might benefit a group of workers). 
83. See, e.g., John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
953 (2000) (assessing the intuition that changes in population are ethically neutral and there­
fore should not be considered in cost-benefit analysis). 
84. Pp. 83-86. Compare John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of 
Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901 (1999) (arguing for the use of dis­
counting in assessing the effects of a regulation on lives in the future), with Lisa Heinzerling, 
Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911 (1999) (disputing Donohue's analysis). 
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issues may become lost in a shuffle of short-term policy concerns.8 5 
Similarly, the judicial station may make judges more likely than agen­
cies to consider abstract questions concerning cost-benefit analysis, 
because judges consider regulations in a posture different from agency 
consideration. To the extent that agencies do examine abstract ques­
tions, even if only in reaction to courts' pronouncements, those 
evaluations deserve the same attention as judicial ones, but a rich 
common law is unlikely to emerge from agencies. That cost-benefit 
analysts have ignored many fundamental questions, perhaps even in a 
way that makes the methodology of cost-benefit analysis as a whole 
biased,8 6 furnishes an argument for a more active judicial role. 
Such a common law might prove useful even when agencies are 
not required to engage in cost-benefit analysis. Though it will be of lit­
tle use in contexts in which the courts have interpreted Congress to 
have prohibited agencies from considering costs, it might be useful 
when an agency considers costs but does not go through the proce­
dural steps of quantifying and comparing all costs and benefits. Ques­
tions about the significance of costs and benefits, like the appropriate 
value for a discount rate, are relevant even where the agency has not 
considered them quantitatively. If, as Sunstein believes, cost-benefit 
analysis is a useful and disciplined form of reasoning, courts should 
proceed quantitatively even if agencies have offered only qualitative 
reasoning. While the courts' assessments might not be in the form of a 
complete cost-benefit analysis, judges could provide at least approxi­
mate metrics by which to gauge the rationality of agency decisions. 
This leaves the question of what a court should do when, in re­
viewing regulations and considering abstract questions of the theory of 
cost-benefit analysis, it finds that the agency performed the analysis 
differently from how the court would have performed it. My answer is 
that the ultimate standard should be no different from what it has long 
been. As long as an agency has offered sufficient explanation of its de­
cisions, and as long as these explanations are not implausible, the 
court should allow the agency decision to stand.8 7 This assessment, 
however, should be made against the backdrop of the courts' devel­
oping common law principles. Where an agency proceeds in a manner 
different from what courts have recommended, and without providing 
sufficient explanation, the decision should be vacated. If, however, an 
agency considers the courts' prior analyses, as well as any that other 
85. Christopher Eisgruber offers a related pragmatic argument, suggesting that judges 
may be best equipped to represent the people in resolving dilemmas of democratic govern­
ance. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 49-52 (2001). 
86. See Frank, supra note 6. 
87. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("What 
we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary . . .  of the reasons 
why he chooses to follow one course rather than another."). 
1738 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1708 
agencies have offered on similar questions, then its decision should be 
upheld as long as it is reasonable. 
A virtue of the common law of cost-benefit analysis I describe is 
that it requires only a change in orientation, not a change in doctrine. 
It might seem that I have jettisoned the principle of stare decisis, but 
that is not so. Rather, the reason that courts ought not consider their 
predecessors' views on particular issues dispositive is that the explora­
tion of cost-benefit principles is always made in the context of deter­
mining whether a particular regulation is reasonable. If one judicial 
panel finds that an agency could have used a superior approach in per­
forming contingent valuation, for example, the court still might not 
find the agency unreasonable. And even if it did, a later panel might 
still uphold an agency using the same methodology labeled unsatisfac­
tory by the first. This might be because the agency offered cogent rea­
sons not considered by the first court to use the methodology. Or, it 
might be because even considering the decisionmaking defect, the 
agency's ultimate decision, all things considered, was within the realm 
of reasonableness. Such a finding would be particularly likely when 
the second agency made its decision before the initial court ruling, 
thus making judicial pronouncements prospective only. 
Despite its generally deferential posture, judicial review under my 
proposal offers the hope of substantially improving agency decision­
making. Sunstein's central insight is that the rigor of cost-benefit 
analysis might affect the decisions that agency officials reach by fo­
cusing them on relatively important considerations. My claim is that 
this can have full effect only if agency officials have a reason to take 
cost-benefit analysis seriously. Judicial review, as I have described it, 
would force officials to do so because they would realize that courts 
were taking it seriously in turn. There is a substantial difference be­
tween a regime in which an agency can choose from a wide range of 
plausible valuations of variables to one in which it must explain its 
choices because courts are attuned to the issues underlying those 
choices. If agency decisions were the same as in the absence of this 
form of judicial review, more regulations would likely be vacated, be­
cause review would call attention to deficiencies in agency reasoning 
that otherwise might go unnoticed. Agencies, though, would respond 
to such review with more careful analyses of their own, thus leaving 
the overall rate of judicial invalidation of regulations perhaps not too 
different from before. 
C. Agency Reputation in Judicial Review 
My suggestion has been to allow quantitative considerations and 
underlying theories of cost-benefit analysis to influence judicial review 
without necessarily changing the overall level of deference. One ad­
vantage of such an approach to judicial review is that it might facilitate 
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the courts' consideration of a wider range of factors relevant to a deci­
sion whether to invalidate a regulation. For example, quantitative 
analysis would make it easier to determine whether the agency was 
consistently choosing values for variables in a conservative or aggres­
sive way. While one disagreement with an agency's methodology ordi­
narily should not be sufficient to overturn a cost-benefit analysis, if the 
court identifies a persistent pattern across a range of issues, invalida­
tion may be appropriate. Such a pattern supports a judgment that the 
agency, in making its ultimate decision to approve a regulation, acted 
unreasonably.8 8  It is far more difficult to identify such a pattern with 
more traditional qualitative arguments. With such arguments, the 
agency is expected to explain why arguments against the regulation 
are insufficient to stop the agency from going forward, and the 
agency's response that each of the arguments is inadequate does not 
indicate bad faith. 
Implicit in analysis seeking to identify patterns in an agency's rea­
soning processes is the recognition of the importance of reputation. 
When an agency seems to have acted fairly and moderately in making 
a decision on one variable, that strengthens the case that the agency 
intended to do so in considering another variable. The reputation of 
agencies, however, could be considered across cases as well. Perhaps 
courts already consider agency reputation implicitly, seeking to curtail 
agencies with a reputation for stretching their authority or achieving 
ideological objectives. But a quantitatively oriented judicial review 
might facilitate more explicit cross-case comparisons. A court should 
be more inclined to overturn a regulation when courts' independent 
assessments continually suggest the agency is enacting regulations 
whose costs exceed benefits than when it is only in the immediate case 
that the court's views on the net benefits of a regulation differ from 
the agency's. If courts were to consider explicitly past assessments of 
an agency's decisions, the agency would take into account not only its 
immediate objectives but also that aggressiveness might cost it reputa­
tional capital over the long term. 
I realize that the suggestion that courts explicitly consider agency 
reputation may be controversial. It might, however, increase the sig­
nificance of "prompt letters" that the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") uses to urge regulation with positive net 
benefits, which Sunstein identifies as a way that cost-benefit analysis 
can encourage good regulation rather than discourage bad regulation 
(p. 7). If OIRA has issued numerous prompt letters to an agency, and 
instead of responding to these letters the agency has proceeded on 
regulations whose costs seem to greatly exceed benefits, there is a 
strong reason to conclude that the agency's priorities are amiss. This 
88. See supra Section II.B.2. 
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may be because of interest group influence or simply because of lack 
of attention to regulatory priorities. A court should be more skeptical 
of regulations from such an agency than from one that has received 
few prompt letters. On the other hand, such letters may indicate a lack 
of sufficient agency resources, especially if the regulations that the 
agency does enact all seem to have benefits in excess of costs. In such 
a case, a court ought to demand less from an agency by way of expla­
nation, because the procedural demands of administrative law may be 
preventing the agency from achieving its mission. In addition, courts 
might consider the extent to which an agency seems to be responding 
to prompt letters, thus improving OIRA's ability to encourage agen­
cies to address significant problems. 
It might seem that my analysis has been one-sided, focusing on 
agency reputation but not on judicial reputation. After all, I have ar­
gued that just as we should seek to avoid agency decisionmaking that 
is primarily ideological, so too should we recognize that judges may be 
influenced by their own ideology, and that random selection of judges 
means that whether a regulation is assessed by a conservative or a lib­
eral may be a matter of luck.89 An analysis of agency reputation as re­
vealed through a range of cases, however, indirectly results in consid­
eration of judicial reputation. If judges consistently find that an agency 
seeks to enact regulations whose costs apparently exceed benefits, or 
that an agency consistently ignores sound principles of cost-benefit 
analysis, the consistency of these conclusions suggests that they are not 
merely attributable to the political preferences of any individual judge. 
A practice of considering agency decisions over a range of cases thus 
might make case resolutions less susceptible to any single judge's or 
single panel's political orientation. In effect, a judge can bond herself 
not to allow ideology to play a significant role by placing emphasis not 
only on whether her perspective differs from the agency's in a par­
ticular case but also on whether previous judges in cases involving the 
agency have had similar concerns. 
Nonetheless, judicial review might be better still if judges explicitly 
considered the politics of one another. This may be my most contro­
versial conclusion, for it may seem inconsistent with courts' efforts to 
appear above the political fray.90 But an observation by a relatively 
liberal panel to cite a previous panel's chastisement of an agency 
seems more relevant if that previous panel was conservative rather 
than liberal, and vice versa. In everyday interactions, after all, we are 
ordinarily more inclined to accept positions when individuals on both 
sides of the political spectrum endorse them. Someone told of The 
89. See supra Section Ill.A.2. 
90. Judges sometimes bristle at academics who observe an ideological component to 
their decisionmaking. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the 
D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998); Wald, supra note 79. 
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Cost-Benefit State's enthusiasm for cost-benefit analysis might be more 
inclined to accept its arguments because its author is the relatively lib­
eral Cass Sunstein than if the author were a known conservative. And 
that, along with the quality and innovation of the underlying argu­
ments, helps explain why The Cost-Benefit State is an important book 
indeed. 
CONCLUSION 
I have advocated that courts develop a common law considering 
the most difficult questions of cost-benefit analysis. In the end, this 
recommendation finds inspiration in Sunstein's own writing. In his 
1989 article, Sunstein wrote: 
Sympathetic engagement with regulatory purposes, together with a solid 
understanding of regulatory pathologies, ultimately might lead to a set of 
principles by which courts could indeed bring about "net benefits" 
through judicial review. No one should argue that the judiciary should 
play the central role in ensuring legality, rationality, or justice in the ad­
ministrative process. But it would be difficult to deny that a judiciary 
suitably sensitive to the functions and failures of the regulatory state 
might well make things better rather than worse.91 
In The Cost-Benefit State, Sunstein himself reveals both "engagement 
with regulatory purposes" and "understanding of regulatory patholo­
gies,'' and he shows how cost-benefit analysis may help agency officials 
fulfill purposes while avoiding pathologies. It is puzzling, then, that 
this work does not seem to recognize that cost-benefit analysis may it­
self provide "a set of principles by which courts could indeed bring 
about 'net benefits' through judicial review." Though courts should 
recognize the limits and dangers of their role, judicial attention to the 
principles of cost-benefit analysis can only improve the quality of ad­
ministrative decisionmaking. 
91. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 537. 
